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CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT WITH THEJAPANESE
IMPERIAL ROLE: ACCESSION, YASUKUNI SHRINE, AND
OBLIGATORY REFORMATION
Noah Berlin'
Tate no rymen o miyo
-Japanese Proverb
"Every medal has two sides"'
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution of Japan is inherently flawed, and must be
amended to reflect the reality of the Emperor's role. Chapter 1 of
the Japanese Constitution, which defines the role of the Emperor,
does not in practice harmonize with Article 20, separating religion
and state. Though seemingly not in conflict as a textual matter, a
closer examination reveals that the relationship between Chapter 1
and Article 20 is not, as it stands today, legally justiciable. The need
forJapanese constitutional reform is evidenced by an examination of
the role of the Emperor conducted in light of current State practice,
and is most notably reflected by a recent Japanese Supreme Court
decision questioning the constitutionality of government payments to
Yasukuni Shrine.
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SKoTOwAZA No IZuMI [Fountain ofJapanese Proverbs] 280 (Taiji Takashima ed. & trans.,
1995) [hereinafterJapaneseProverbs].
2 See Hanrei Heisei Yonen (gyo-tsu) Dai-156-go Heisei Kyuunen Shigasu Futsuka Taih6tei
Hanketsu [Precedential Judgement of Fundamental Governmental Law # 156 of Apr. 2, 1997
(originating 1992)], Saikosai [Supreme Court] (Japan), [hereinafter Yasuhuni Shrine case] (vis-
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judgement entitled Heisei Yonen (gyo-tsu) Dai-156-go Heisei Kyuunen Shigatsu Futsuka
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In short, the currentJapanese Emperor, by assuming his historical
role as chief shaman-priest of the Shinto religion and constitutionally
mandated symbol of the State, cannot truly fulfill these roles without
violating, at a minimum, Articles 4s and 204 of the Japanese Constitu-
tion. In order to accommodate the current role of the Emperor, the
constitution must be amended to allow an Imperial exception to the
provision that strictly separates religion and State. Although constitu-
tional amendment will not quell the controversy over the "figure-
head" status of the Emperor, it will resolve the current incongruity of
the constitutional jurisprudence analyzing the modem Imperial role.
The coexistence of the Imperial dynasty and the Constitution of
Japan presents an illustrative example, relevant in almost every coun-
try in the world today, of the avenues by which democratic principles
can collide with religious and political traditions. By examining the
nature of the Imperial Monarch through the lens of the Japanese
Constitutional system, and consequently understanding the Em-
peror's unique role in Japanese society, constitutional error can be
rectified while at the same time respecting and preserving the dignity,
historical background, and realpolitik of the Imperial role.
To demonstrate the conflict between the Emperor's current role
and contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, it is first necessary to
examine briefly the role of the Emperor in historical context. The
postwar role of the Emperor was not created in a vacuum, and it can-
not be reckoned without a jaundiced eye.5 The Imperial dynasty's
historical and religious traditions, unparalleled in size and scope,
have created the unique constitutional dilemma Japan faces today.
Taih6tei Hanketsu [judgement of Fundamental Governmental Law# 156 of Apr. 2, 1997].
To access the full content of the <http://wiv.courts.go.jp> website, your Internet browser
must first be configured to read Japanese characters. Microsoft Internet Explorer, version 3.02,
can be configured to read Japanese characters by installing a Japanese Character Kit, available
from the <http://www.microsoft.com> website.
3 Article 4 of the Japanese Constitution provides, in relevant part: "The Emperor shall per-
form only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not
have powers related to government." KENP6 [CONSTrTUTION], ch. 1, art. 4, translated in THE
CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: [Ts FIRST TENTYYEARS, 1947-67, app. at 302 (Dan Fenno Henderson
ed., Univ. of Washington Press 1968).
4 Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution provides:
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall
receive any privileges from the State nor exercise political authority. 2. No
person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts, celebration,
rite or practice. 3. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious
education or any other religious activity.
Id. at app. 304.
The Emperor of Japan is traditionally conceived of as the lineal descendant of the Sun
Goddess, Ameratasu Omikami. According to Shinto legend, She gave the sacred sword, jewel,
and mirror, to her grandson Ninigi no Mikoto before he descended upon the island of Japan.
These three Imperial treasures have been handed down from one Emperor to the next since
that time. The sword is kept at Atsuta Grand Shrine, the jewel at the Imperial Palace, and the
mirror at Ise Grand Shrine. See STEPHEN S. LARGE, EMPEROR HIROHrro & SHOWA JAPAN: A
POLrIcAL BIOGRAPHY 5 (1992).
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There are several particulars integral to assessing this constitutional
conflict.
Section I of this Comment examines the Meifi Constitution of
1889.6 This document, built around the concept of kokulai, or "na-
tional polity," is the foundation of modem Japanese constitutional-
ism. Section II introduces, in historical terms, the realpolilik role of
the Emperor and traces the development of State Shinto. Section I
analyzes the origins of the 1947 Showa Constitution through examina-
tion of the Japanese surrender to Allied forces at the conclusion of
the Second World War and the resultant reformation of the Imperial
institution. Section IV explores the creation and adoption of the
1947 Showa Constitution, and deconstructs the dismantling of state
religious practice in both practical and constitutional terms. Section
V discusses the Emperor's social and religious role following the Sec-
ond World War, particularly the rites associated with the death of
Emperor Hirohito and the accession of Emperor Akihito.
Building upon the historical, sociopolitical, and legal context pre-
sented in Sections I through V, Section VI discusses recent constitu-
tional jurisprudence by examining the Yasukuni Shrine and related
cases, revealing how Japanese courts have addressed the sharp con-
flict between Imperial duties and the constitutionally mandated sepa-
ration of religion and state. Section VI raises the inference that con-
stitutional reformation is necessary. Section VII addresses possible
constitutional reforms.
The cumulative analysis presented in this Comment, in summary,
attempts to make it eminently clear that the reasons for the enact-
ment ofJapan's irreconcilable constitutional articles are the result of
grievous misunderstandings of the Emperor's true role and the diffi-
culties in re-democratizing Japan after the Second World War. The
best course of action, therefore, is to amend Japan's 1947 Constitu-
tion to correct the mischaracterization of the Emperor's role and
thus prevent repeated constitutional violations that current jurispru-
dence has only recently revealed.
6 The Constitution of 1889 is often referred to as the Meji Constitution. Mnji, meaning
enlightened rule," is the Japanese name given to the reign of the Emperor Mutsulito (186.-
1912). See DAnuCln IROKAWA, THE AGE OF HIROHrro: IN SE ARCH OF MODERNJ.%PA.N 9 (1995).
EachJapanese Emperor's reign is given such a name. For example, Taisho, meaning 'greatjus-
tice," is theJapanese name given to the reign of the Emperor Yoshihito (1912-1926). &eLRGCE.
supra note 5, at 15, 223 n.3; IROKAWA, supra at 9. Showa, meaning "illustrious peace." is the
Japanese name given to the reign of the Emperor commonly referred to as Emperor Hirohito
(1926-1989). See L'.RGE, supra at 223 n.2; IROKAWA, supra at 9. Hnsi, meaning "achieing
peace," is theJapanese name given to the reign of the Emperor commonly referred to as Em-
peror Akihito (1989-present). Se LARGE, supra note 5, at 200. Emperor Hirohito is referred to
in this Comment alternatively as the Shwa Emperor or Emperor Hirohito.
Like the Mji Constitution, the 1947 Constitution is alternatively referred to in tiis Com-
ment as the Showa Constitution or the 1947 Showa Constitution.
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION
A. The Meiji Constitution of 1889
On the Eleventh of February 1889, more than twenty years after
the restoration of the Emperor Meiji to the Imperial throne," the
Meiji Constitution was enacted. Its enactment realized years of delib-
eration and consummated the desire ofJapanese Imperial subjects to
live by reformist principles within governmental forms forged by pub-
lic opinion.9 The document is particularly useful because it gives con-
text to the analysis of the presentJapanese Constitution.
While the Meiji Constitution contained trappings of western con-
stitutions,' o such as the creation of executive, legislative, and judiciary
branches of government, it lacked the checks and balances of, for ex-
ample, the American Constitution, and the separation of powers evi-
dent in the constitutions of many other countries." While in theory
the Meiji Constitution contained some of the fundamental underpin-
nings of democracy, in practice it created an absolute monarchy cen-
tered around and with all power emanating from the Emperor.'2 The
Meiji Constitution provided for freedom of speech, religion, assem-
bly, and association, but only insofar as they were "within the limits of
the law." 3  Consequently, the government, through the Emperor,
could restrict any of these freedoms, so long as the restriction was of-
ficially proscribed by law. 4 Therefore, in the decades preceding the
Second World War, Japan's militarism and aggressive behavior to-
wards its neighbors did not conflict with the Meiji Constitution be-
8 The Emperor Meiji was restored to the throne on March 14, 1868. This event is com-
monly referred to as the "Meiji Restoration," titled as such because of the transfer of power
from the neo-feudal Tokugawa Bakufu Shogunate to a group of reformers united under a more
nationalized government. See SHIN'ICHI FujiI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A HiSToItcAL
SURVEY 43 (1965); JANET E. HUNTER, THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN JAPAN: AN INTRODUCTORY
HISTORYSINCE 1853, 2-5 (1989).
9 See Fujii, supra note 8, at 266 (discussing the celebratory nature of the enactment of the
Meiji Constitution).
Extensive studies were made, for example, of the French, Belgian, and American Consti-
tutions. See id. at 189.
n SeeTHE CONSTITrUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRsT TWENTYYEARS, 1947-67, supra note 3, at 6 (dis-
cussing the Meiji Constitution's structure).
Although the Emperor had supreme political power, he did not participate in the admini-
stration of the government, but instead ruled through the Ministers of State. It has been ar-
gued that this linkage created an oligarchic structure of highly placed Ministers, Cabinet mem-
bers, Privy Council, and Imperial Household Ministers who truly ran the country, giving the
emperor more of a puppet status than that of absolute ruler. See GEORGE M. BECKMANN, THE
MAKING OF THE MEIJI CONSTITUTION: THE OLIGARCHS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
OFJAPAN, 1868-1891, 89-90 (1957). As a result, many were led to believe that the symbol of the
emperor could be used to turnJapan into a democracy. See infra notes 49-55 and accompanying
text (discussing wartime State Department plans for the emperorship).
13 BECKMANN, supra note 12, at 7.
14 See id. ("As a result the Constitution provided no limits on the government's power to re-
strict any freedom enumerated in it.").
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cause these actions were all proscribed by law that, strictly speaking,"
emanated from the Emperor.
6
B. Kokutai-Centrality of the Emperor in the Meiji Constitution
The Meiji constitutional style is often represented by the Japanese
word kokutai, or "national polity," t7 a term that is said to imply state
supremacy and obedience to the Emperor.5 The concept of kokutai,
especially in the decades preceding the Second World War, was so
pervasive that it functioned as the dominant paradigm of "Japanese"
identity.'9 As one scholar described the glorification of kokutai in
Japanese Ministry of Education elementary school textbooks preced-
ing the War:
[Textbook] authors steadily expanded State Shinto and its
vague glittering slogans, such as 'Purifying the Kokutai.'
More important, from 1910 onward textbook lessons taught
... that loyalty to the emperor and filial piety were one
and the same and that the ancestral will was obedience to
imperial will. The individual was nothing; the will of the
emperor and the kokutaiwere everything.s
The Meiji Constitution, constructed around the concept of kohutai,
has even been referred to as a kintei kenpo [kenpo], or "constitution
made by the ruler himself."-' From this characterization of the Meiji
Constitution, it is evident that the Emperor played a central role in
the governance of Japan, serving as the binding agent that holds the
kokutai together. In essence, the role of the Emperor created by the
Meiji Constitution vis4-vis the State-if one accepts the concept of ho-
kutai-is one dear indication that separation of religion and state in a
framework ofJapanese constitutionalism is impossible and, by defini-
tion, a contradiction in terms. Certainly, it may be argued that the
15 The Emperor did not actually engage in administration of the Japanese government. See
supra note 12; see also infra notes 31-32 and accompan)ing text (discussing the practical exercise
of political power by the Emperor).
6 SeeTHE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENIYYEARS, 1947-67, supra note 3, at 7-8
(discussing a cultural view of the Emperor's power). For a political analysis of this question, see
JUNJI BANNO, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEJAPANESE CONSTrIUTIO NAL SYTE.M UI.A.A. Stockvwin
trans., Routledge 1992).
17 SeeTHE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRST TWIEN"YYEARS, 1947-67, supra note 3. at 8.
18 See id; see also IROKIAWA, supra note 6, at 25 ("The ideology of national polity enveloped
the entire Japanese nation. It had an incredible presence .... There was complete social con-
sensus that those who violated these ideologies should be eliminated or that they inevitably
would be eliminated.").
19 See Wniiuti P. WOODARD, THE ALuED OCCUPATION OF JAPAN 1945-1952 AND JAdA.SE
RELIGIONS 11 (1972) (discussing kokutai as the fundamental and defining politico-cultural char-
acteristic ofJapan).
' JAPAN ExAMmED: PERSPEcTIVES ON MODERNJAPANESE HISTORY 286 (Hary Wray & Hilary
Conroy eds., 1983).
21 Fuj, supra note 8, at 279.
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constitutional reforms of the Allied Occupation2 2 eliminated kokutai,
but this only illuminates the more central question of the Imperial
role, which, as recent Japanese Supreme Court jurisprudence has
shown, even absent the ideological extremism of ultra-right-wing ko-
kutai theory, that the Emperor's de jure reduction to constitutional
figurehead is irreconcilable with the de facto religious role that Japa-
nese societal conventions dictate.
C. The Meiji Constitution: Text and Reality
The Imperial powers were outlined in Chapter I of the Meiji Con-
stitution in seventeen articles that reaffirmed the sacred, inviolable
nature of the Emperor, and vested in him powers ranging from su-
preme command of the army and navy to the determination of civil
and military salaries.' 3 The Meiji Constitution contemplated Imperial
rule under its terms forever. Chapter I, Article I provides: "The Em-
pire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Tenno
unbroken for ages eternal."
2 4
II. REALPOLITIKROLE OF THE EMPEROR AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF STATE SHINTO'
Though "inviolable," the Emperor was not considered to be a po-
litical leader ruling by virtue of his religious authority. 6 Rather, the
Emperor was more like a "chief priest" or "shaman king."27 Emperor
Hirohito, for example, typically conducted approximately thirty
Shinto rites a year.28 While the Emperor's participation in harvest
rituals was believed essential to ensure a good harvest, he rarely, if
ever, proffered his opinions on political matters. In instances where
the Emperor has ventured his political opinion, he has done so only
in extreme circumstances.29 After the twelfth century, the Imperial
The Allied Occupation followed the surrender of the Japanese to the Allied Forces on
August 15, 1945. SeePAUL MANNING, HIROHrro: THEWARYEARS 161 (1986).
See generally, MEIJI KENP6 [Meiji Constitution], ch. 1, translated in Fujii, supra note 8, at 298-
300.
24 Id., art I, at 298-99.
21 Shinto literally means "the way of the kami [gods]." See WILHELMus H. M. CREEMERS,
SHRINE SHINTO AFrER WORLD WAR 11, 3 (1968). "Shinto grew out of the earliestJapanese tradi-
tions and gradually took shape as an organized religion under the influence of Buddhism and
Chinese culture .... Shinto is the only organized religion to arise in Japan. Shinto preserves
ancient Japanese heritage, and there has been close identification between Shinto, Emperor,
and State." H. BYRON EARHART, RELIGION IN THE JAPANESE EXPERIENCE: SOURCES AND
INTERPRETATIONS 6 (1997).
26 See LARGE, supra note 5, at 7.
27 See id. at 6.
28 Emperor Hirohito performed these rituals even as late as 1968, long after he had dis-
claimed his divinity. See THOMAS CRUMP, THE DEATH OF AN EMPEROR: JAPAN AT TIlE
CROSSROADS 22 (1989).
29 For a discussion of the Emperor's influence on the Japanese surrender, see infra note 74
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family had little power other than in the performance of ceremonial
duties. True power lay with the warrior families and their paternal
leaders, who were typically appointed shogun, or "%-arlord appointee
of the Emperor.""
While the Meiji Constitution vested in the Emperor absolute ex-
ecutive power, he did not actually engage in administration of the
Japanese government, as might be expected of what %%as, in structure,
a constitutional dictatorship.-" Rather, under the Meiji Constitution,
as one commentator explained,
The cabinet is the organ, through which the Emperor's sov-
ereignty is manifested. In the practical operation of gov-
ernment, the Emperor is not expected to manifest a will of
his own, except in so far as he may persuade his ministers to
alter what they had decided. The oligarchs were able to
point to the historical precedent of an unwritten law more
than a thousand years old that... politically, [the Emperor]
shall be impersonal and let properly constituted authorities
act as his responsible ministers. n
What the Emperor lacked in administrative power was more than
compensated by the religious ascendancy he derived from the MlJeiji
State devotion to kokutai ideology."' Freedom of religion, for exam-
ple, wvas guaranteed by Article XXVIII of the Meii Constitution,
which read, "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to
peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, en-
joy freedom of religious belief." The government did allow religious
freedom to be exercised, but stressed governmental legitimacy by
continually reasserting the religious aspects of the Emperor through
the use of kokutai ideology.ss So as not to violate Article XXqlI, the
Japanese government declared Shinto shrine ceremonies to be non-
religious activities, placing them outside the protections of Article
XXVIII and elevating Shintoism to an extra-legal secular social con-
struct of the state.36 This Meiji-era fictitious legal separation is ex-
tremely instructive in resolving the current constitutional crisis be-
cause it neatly compartmentalizes, though fictionally, certain
religious aspects as "state rite" exceptions.
37
While clinging to legal pseudo-separation, the Meiji government
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Emperor's influence on the adoption of the
present constitution, see infra notes 112-116 and accompanying text.
so SeeHUNTER, supra note 8, at 159.
1 SeeBEctANN, supra note 12, at 89.
2 1& at 89 (quoting Asakam Kanichi, Some Contribulions of FeudalJapan to the VewJapan, Ill
JOURNAL OF RACE DEVELOPMENT, 30 (1912)).
SeeEARHART, supra note 25, at 238.
MEIJI KENP6, ch. II, art x-Diii, translated in FLUU. supra note 8, at 301-02.
35 SeeEARHART, supra note 25, at 238.
See CRmff.Rs, supra note 25, at 60.
See U
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nonetheless employed Shinto priests as State officials, and, especially
as militarism grew, Shinto became the defacto state religion.8 As one
post-war dictionary puts it, State Shinto is:
[t]he Shinto which, contrasted to Shinto as a religious cor-
poration, is closely connected with state power through its
militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideas; it regards the Em-
peror as a kami [deity] in human appearance (arahitogami),
and believes that the Japanese people are superior to other
people and are a chosen people as descendants of Amer-
atasu Omikami; it was suppressed in December 1945.-9
Though this definition is an unfair and overbroad portrayal, heav-
ily biased against State Shinto, it accurately reflects the views which
American authorities had of State Shinto during the Second World
War.40 American Occupation authorities viewed State Shinto, espe-
cially its ultranationalist aspect, as a danger, and considered its aboli-
tion an important objective in rewriting the Meiji Constitution.4'
Though the Meiji Constitution remained in force for decades,
from Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese war at the end of the
nineteenth century to the military conquest of Asia in the 1930's, it
was not a document suited to the Allied victors in the Second World
War4 Indeed, the Meiji Constitution, as it stood, was irreconcilable
with the role of the Emperor envisioned by the Allied authorities in
postwarJapan.43 In sum, the Emperor's role under the Meiji Constitu-
don was paradoxical: he was administratively impotent, but at the
same time enshrined as the head of government, his power and su-
premac7 reinforced by the kokutai and nationally mandated State
Shinto.
III. ORIGINS OF THE SHOWA CONSTITUTION OF 1947
A. Negotiating the Surrender ofJapan
The present Constitution of Japan is the product of the Second
World War, specifically the consequence of the unconditional sur-
render of the Japanese forces to the Allied powers on August 15,
1945. 45 The principal issue in brokering the Japanese surrender was
38 See id
9 Id. at 7 (quoting Kofien, at 1121 (Shimmura Izuru, comp, Tokyo, hwanami Shoten, 1960)).
40 See generally D.C. HOLTUM, MODERN JAPAN AND SHINTO NATIONALISM: A STUDY OF
PRESENT-DAY TRENDS INJAPANESE RELIGIONS (rev'd ed. 2"' prtg. 1943).
41 See EARHART, supra note 25, at 38-39.
42 See KYOKO INOUE, MACARTHUR'S JAPANESE CONSTITUTION: A LINGUISTIC AND CULTURAL
STUDYOF ITS MAKING 1 (1991).
43 See LEGAL REFORMS IN JAPAN DURING THE ALLIED OCCUPATION, A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
FROM THE WASHINGTON LAW REvIEW 8 (Washington Law Review Association ed., 1977).
See BECKMANN, supra note 12, at 95.
45 See TETSUYA KATAOKA, THE PRICE OF A CONSTITUTION: THE ORIGIN OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR
POLlTICS 18 (1991).
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the status of the Emperor, a subject that was debated both internally
in the United States and on the world stage."
Although most of the scholars and political scientists who studied
Japan recognized that the Emperor had little or no real political
power, they understood that his divine status was used as a rallying cry
for militarism.4 ' However, most of these analysts failed to appreciate
that the political role of the Emperor was, and still is, inseparable
from his religious role as Shinto leader." This lack of insight and
foresight resulted in a narrow Allied conception of the "Emperor"
problem, and produced the flawed constitution that followed.
The American State Department initially recognized the Emperor
issue on March 10, 1943, in a policy paper on Japan that first asked
the question, "Should the continuance of the imperial household be
favored?"" The internal debate on the issue began formally on May
25, 1943, when the State Department wrote its first assessment of the
problem, entitled "Status of the Japanese Emperor." This assess-
ment presented two primary policy options open to the United States;
either preserve the emperorship, or eliminate it. Arguments in favor
of termination urged that doing so would curb Japanese nationalism
and aggression behind the veil of Imperial authority; xithout the
Emperor, Japan would merely be a polity rather than a divinely gov-
erned polity. Arguments in favor of preserving the Imperial dynasty
recognized that, legally, the Emperor alone could amend the Meiji
Constitution.5' Accordingly, those supporting the presernation of the
emperorship believed that any large-scale changes would be more ef-
fective if initiated under the political and quasi-religious authority of
the Emperor.52 The two opposing views show that the Emperor was
dearly an important figure in the Japanese consciousness. The in-
congruous constitutional role he eventually assumed ultimately de-
rives from the unresolved difficulties encountered in balancing Im-
perial survival and American constitutional principles of separation of
religion and state in the Allied powers' conception of postmarJapan's
political evolution.
46 See Robert E. Ward, Presurrnder Planning, in DE-MOCRATIMrG JAPA.N: THE ALLIED
OCCUPATION 1, 3 (Robert E. Ward & Sakamoto Yoshikazu eds., 1987).
47 see WOODARD, supma note 19, at 9-13 (explaining the Allied belief that the concept of a
divine Emperor was used to indoctrinate the people ofJapan into supporting ultranationalism
and accession).
See i& (noting that the Allied perception of the problem included mistaken beliefs about
the teachings of Shinto, State Shinto, and the divine status of the Emperor).
Ward, supra note 46, at 3 (citing "Agenda for the Meeting of March 13, 1943." National
Archives, Notter Files, Box 57, P-213, Appendix, p.2) (noting that while this policy paper from
the Subcommittee on Political Problems of the Advisory Committee on Postmar Foreign Policy
did not purport to do more than pose the question, it did open the door to formal debate).
See i& (citing "Status of the Japanese Emperor," National Archives, Notter Files, Box 63.J-
315, May 25, 1943).
51 See id. at 4.
See id.
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As the War progressed, the Emperor issue continued to be a con-
troversial one in the State Department and within the governments of
the other Allied powers. 3 It is said that as many as nine-tenths of
State Department Japan specialists, led by Under Secretary of State
Joseph C. Grew, favored preservation of the emperorship, but that
many of the departmental committees and higher-ups who reviewed
the specialists' papers were opposed to its continuation.5 4 Most nota-
ble of those opposed to the preservation of the emperorship was As-
sistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson, but this group also included
other high-ranking officials such as Office of War Information direc-
tor Elmer Davis.55
Outside the halls of government, the debate also raged in the
academic world, with even more extreme arguments pressed forward
by both sides. 6 One commentator believed that democracy in Japan
would be incompatible with the presence of an Emperor. He wrote
in October of 1944:
Democracy lies in the will of the people to rule them-
selves. Its source cannot be the will of a Mikado [Em-
peror], whether or not he is thought to be a god ....
To destroy the present generation of militarists is not
enough; the whole political, educational, and military
machinery which enabled the militarists to hypnotize
the masses of the people must be destroyed also. That
can only be done by puncturing the myth of the divin-
ity of the Mikado [Emperor] 57
A second argument espoused by Imperial naysayers was that the
cult of so-called "emperor-worship" was too strong. Y They claimed
that the Japanese people were too easily led to act in the name of the
Emperor, even to the point of serving as "human bombs"9 during
53 See id. at 4-5
54 See id. at 4; see also JUSTIN WILLIAMS, SR., JAPAN'S POLITICAL REVOLUTION UNDER
MACARTHUR: A PARTICIPAT's AccouNT 15 (1979) (describing the debate over the future of
the4apanese Emperor).
SeeWard, supra note 46, at 4.
See, e.g., Lawrence K. Rosinger, What Future for Japan?, 19 FOREIGN POL'Y REP., Sept. 1,
1943, at 152; Sun Fo, The Mikado Must Go, 23 FoREIGN AFFAiRs 1, Oct. 1944, at 17; Kenneth Col-
grove, What Shall WeDo with theJapanese Emperor?, 6 AMERASIA 9, Oct. 25, 1942, at 376.
57 See Sun Fo, supra note 56, at 24.
s See WOODARD, supra note 19, at 12 (stating that the kokutai "cult" included "[v]eneration
bordering on worship of the spirits of the imperial ancestors, of the imperial rescripts, espe-
cially the Imperial Rescript on Education (for civilians) and the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers
and Sailors (for the armed forces); and of the writings of Emperor Meiji, notably his po-
ems.. .[and] [u]nquestioned acceptance of the myths taught in the official histories of the
country").
The "human bombs" referred to were Japanese soldiers who tied grenades to their belts
and attacked Chinese barbed-wire fences even though they faced certain death. See Colgrove,
supra note 56, at 377. The same principle would be carried out later in the war by the kamikaze
pilots who hurled themselves at the Allied fleet. See DAVID REES, THE DEFEAT OF JAPAN 51
(1997) ("The men in the kamikaze aircraft were only too eager to die for their admiral and
their Emperor.").
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warfare.
60
Some of those who supported the termination of the emperorship
advised that the Imperial Palace and the Ise Grand Shrine, both focal
points of Imperial power,6' should be destroyed in order to deliver a
psychological blow against the Imperial system.0 The decision not to
do so is indicative of the Allied desire to keep the Imperial system
alive, albeit in a severely reduced capacity. The Allies' inherent mis-
judgment regarding the nature of the Imperial role in carrying out
their reforms was memorialized in the construction of a constitution
that aspired to properly balance the need to maintain the Imperial
system to democratize Japan and the need to eliminate ultranational-
ist kokutai ideology. Given the time constraints and the duress of the
postwar reconstruction setting in which the constitutional drafters
worked, it is hardly surprising that issues such as analyzing the relig-
ious context of Imperial succession rituals or Shinto mourning prac-
tices did not appear pressing, or even cognizable as issues with any
constitutional import.
As the end of the war became more imminent, posturar planners
contemplated new ideas, among which was the possibility that the
Japanese would seek to abolish the Imperial dynasty on their own..3
This seemed unlikely, but, nevertheless, postwar planners presumed
that the Japanese would be receptive to the American desire to estab-
lish a strong democratic constitutional framework."
One of the most novel and practical ideas conceived by postwar
planners was the covert forced abdication of the Emperor Hirohito, a
plan which intended to exploit the lack of a personal relationship be-
tween the Japanese people and any one particular emperor.•" Some
planners believed that Emperor Hirohito would accept responsibility
for the war by voluntary abdication.66 Either abdication option would
60 See Colgrove, supra note 56, at 379 ("[T]he war effort ofJapan largely depends upon the
national unity which is partially fostered by Emperor -worship.").
61 The Ise Shrine, in Ise, contains one of the three divine implements of the Imperial
throne: the mirror of Amaterasu-o-mi-kami, the legendary Sun Goddess who began the Imperial
line of descendency. SeeLARGE, supra note 5, at 1, 223 n.1.
62 See Colgrove, supra note 56, at 376-381 (discussing the impact of destro)ing such signifi-
cant locations).
6 SeeWard, supra note 46, at 4-5 (explaining the impact that possible abolishment of the
emaerorship by theJapanese had on debates over the future of the Imperial dynasty).
See id at 7.
The depersonalized nature of the relationship between the Emperor andJapanese people
was seen in very positive terms by the novelist Yukio Mishima. See T. FuJTA.NI. SPLFNDID
MONARCHY: POWER AND PAGEANTRY IN MODERN JAPAN 232 (1996) ('Yet what distinguishes
Mishima's diagnosis of the culture crisis in Japan, and what characterizes it as a product of
modernJapanese history, is his call for the people to reinvigorate the national culture through
the revival of what he called 'the emperor as a cultural concept' (bund.a gamin toshite no
tenno) ... Mishima claimed that only the 'invisible' emperor, a symbol that could not be seen or
objectified in its wholeness, could serve as the source of creativity for theJapanese people.").
SeeWard, supra note 46, at 4-5 (noting that these planning initiatives took place in 1944.
and were met with general disfavor by the military).
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have put Crown Prince Akihito, who is now Emperor, on the throne
in 1946 at age fourteen." There is some historical evidence that Em-
peror Hirohito might have voluntarily abdicated. The Emperor was
quoted on June 8, 1948 as saying, "I, too, think that if it were possible
for me to abdicate, personally I would be happy. I have a strong
sense that this would help the realization of democracy in Japan,
which I would like to see happen. ""' The Emperor's voluntary abdica-
tion never materialized, due in large part to the intervention of Gen-
eral MacArthur, who is said to have dissuaded the Emperor from do-
ing so.69
In addition to the resolution of the "Emperor question," other le-
gal guidelines governed the establishment of Japan's 1947 Constitu-
tion. Negotiations for surrender drew heavily on the terms of the
Potsdam Declaration,7 which committed the Allies to withdraw their
forces from Japan when several objectives had been achieved.
Among these objectives was the establishment "in accordance with
the freely expressed will of the Japanese people [of] a peacefully in-
clined and responsible government."
71
The Japanese, intent on protecting the Imperial throne, agreed to
the terms of the Potsdam Declaration in their surrender, but only
"with the understanding that the said Declaration does not comprise
any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a
sovereign ruler."72 Before accepting these Japanese terms of surren-
der, the Americans in turn requested that "[f]rom the moment of
surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese govern-
ment to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of
the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems necessary to
effectuate the surrender terms.""




70 The Potsdam Declaration was signed on July 26, 1945. See WILLIuums, supra note 54, at 98
(discussing which aspects of the Japanese Constitution derived from American involvement).
71 Id (quoting Article 12 of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945). Critics of the 1947
Showa Constitution maintain, with a strong degree of accuracy, that the 1947 Constitution was
imposed by the Allies and, though promulgated officially by the Japanese government, was not
reflective of the "freely expressed will of the Japanese people." Seemingly, the "freely expressed
will of the Japanese people" is more likely reflected in the Matsumoto draft which the Allies
found unacceptable. See infra notes 109-110 and accompanying text (discussing MacArthur's
expectations for constitutional revision).
72 MANNING, supra note 22, at 157. The decision was made in a heated discussion of the Su-
preme Council on the night of August 9, 1945. At approximately 2:00 a.m., on August 10, the
Emperor, according to the diary of Togo, himself, requested that the war be stopped, with the
.sovereign" condition. All those present acceded to the Emperor's request. At this time, the
Japanese Prime Minister and two top military Ministers agreed that if the Allies did not retain
the Imperial dynasty, they would continue the war to the death. See HERBERT FEIS, JAPAN
SUBDUED: THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE END OF THE WAR IN THE PACIFIC 118-120 (1961) (describ-
ing the events of August 9-10, 1945).
7 MANNING, supra note 22, at 158.
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The Japanese, faced with the prospect of more atomic bomb at-
tacks like those carried out on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, consented to
the Allied terms, and at noon on August 15, the Emperor made his
historical surrender broadcast to the Japanese people.74 As the New
York Times captioned a report on Allied troop reaction to the Allied
plan to preserve the emperorship, "GI's in Pacific Go Wild With Joy;
'Let 'Em. Keep Emperor,' They Say."5 Thus, the Japanese secured
the Imperial dynasty to some degree, but subject to the discretion of
the Supreme Commander for the Allied Forces, General Douglas
MacArthur. MacArthur's discretion, as it turned out, set the stage for
the constitutional conflict that exists today.
B. Reforming the Imperial Institution: Emperor in Transition
As Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas
MacArthur wielded absolute authority over postwarJapan."' When he
arrived in Japan from Manila on August 30, 1945, the United States
Government, despite having researched the matter thoroughly, had
not yet developed its position on the Emperor's postwar status.
Whether out of self-interest or in furtherance of the interest in the
Japanese people, Emperor Hirohito cooperated with MacArthur to
the utmost. 8 When the Emperor and General MacArthur met face-
to-face for the first time on September 27, 1945, the Emperor is
quoted as saying, "I come to you General MacArthur, to offer myself
to the judgement of the powers you represent as the one to bear sole
responsibility for every political and military decision made and ac-
tion taken by my people in the conduct of the ivar."" General
MacArthur was apparently pleased by the Emperor's solemn oath of
responsibility, and is later reported as saying about that moment, "He
was an Emperor by inherent birth, but in that instant I knew I faced
the First Gentleman ofJapan in his own right."'9
In conversations with General MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito
pleaded his constitutional case for not ending the war sooner. He
claimed, "[b]ut I'm a constitutional monarch. If I am advised by my
prime minister and the other ministers that [an action] must be
done, I must do it, even if I don't like it."9' This explanation prof-
fered by Emperor Hirohito supports the assertion made by many
74 SeeREEs, supra note 59, at 182-83.
"5 FEiS, supra note 72, at 126.
16 SeeREES, supra note 59, at 198.
SeeINOUE, supm note 42, at 160.
18 See CRuMP, supra note 28, at 154 (discussing Emperor's explanation forJapanese surren-
der).
'9Id.
81 GEOFFREY PER Er, OLD SOLDIERS NEvER DI: THE LIFE OF GEtm DOuGcAs
MACARTHUR 484 (1996).
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scholars thatJapan's oligarchic structure under the Meiji Constitution
left the Emperor devoid of any substantive political power.82 Thus,
the Emperor's candid characterization of the nature of his political
power provided some insights into postwar reform of his role in the
Japanese political system. The question of his religious power and in-
fluence became a separate question that was not fully resolved.
It is reported that when the suggestion was put to the Emperor
that he renounce his divinity, he thought it would be embarrassing to
publicly take something away from himself which he never claimed to
possess.83 General MacArthur never personally commanded the Em-
peror to renounce his divinity, and the truth of how the Emperor de-
cided to make a public announcement to this effect is somewhat
speculative. 84 Keeping in line with his thoughts on abdication for the
sake of democracy, and without going as far as abdication, s5 on New
Year's Day, 1946, the Emperor read the now famous Imperial Re-
script in which he denied his own divinity:
We stand by the people and we wish always to share with
them in their moments ofjoy and sorrow. The ties between
us and our people have always stood upon mutual trust and
affection. They do not depend on mere legends and myths.
They are not predicated on the false conception that the
Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are supe-
rior to other races, and fated to rule the world.86
Emperor Hirohito's announcement had the effect of renouncing his
status as the arahitogami, or "divine present emperor."
8
Following Japan's surrender, there was considerable worldwide
pressure to try the Emperor as a war criminal.ss On September 18,
1945, a democratic senator from Georgia, Richard B. Russell, intro-
duced just such a resolution in Congress.9  General MacArthur is
8 See BECKMANN, supra note 12, at 89-90.
83 See RUTH BENEDICT, THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD: PATTERNS OF JAPANESE
CULTURE 309 (Houghton Mifflin ed. 1989) (1946) (describing the Emperor's protests to re-
nouncing his divinity).
84 See WOODARD, supra note 19, at 253-55 (examining the circumstances surrounding the
announcement).
al See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of Emperor Hiro-
hito's abdication).
86 MANNING, supra note 22, at 195.
87 The divine status of the Emperor is still a matter of dispute. See CRUMP, supra note 28, at
157 ("It cannot be said that the Japanese were ever completely convinced by the emperor's dis-
claimer."); see also IROKAWA, supra note 6, at 126-27 (discussing interpretations of the Emperor's
renunciation of his divine status).
88 Countries which supported the trial of Hirohito included the United States, Australia,
Great Britain, China, New Zealand, and the Soviet Union. SeeINOUE, supra note 42, at 161 (de-
scribing a congressional resolution introduced by Richard B. Russell, a Senator from Georgia);
see also MANNING, supra note 22, at 211 (describing Australia's official request that Hirohito be
tried as a war criminal); see also CRUMP, supra note 28, at 177 (listing countries that wanted the
Emperor listed as a war criminal).
SeeINOUE, supra note 42, at 161 (describing Senator Russell's resolution).
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credited with convincing President Truman, as well as the Senator
from Georgia, to spare the Emperor from a trial before a w-ar crimes
tribunal by emphasizing the necessity, if such a course of action was
pursued, of Occupation reinforcements.? As MacArthur %wote:
Realizing the tragic consequences that would follow from
such an unjust action, I had stoutly resisted such efforts.
When Washington seemed to be veering toward the British
point of view [supporting a trial], I had advised that I would
need at least one million reinforcements should such action
be taken. I believed that if the emperor was indicted, and
perhaps hanged, as a war criminal, military government
would have to be instituted throughout all Japan, and guer-
Uila warfare would probably break out. 9'
As for the Allied Forces' reconfiguration of the Emperor's postwar
role, the most relevant report, entitled "209/1," was prepared by the
Subcommittee on the Far East for the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee (SWNCC).? Report 209/1 envisioned three principal re-
forms for the Imperial line. First, it intended to revise the Aleiji Con-
stitution to erase any references to the Emperor's divinity." Second,
it proposed to eliminate "emperor-worship" from the school system, '7
and third, it planned to end procedures that kept the emperor sepa-
rated from the general public. 5 Each of these policy directives were
followed by MacArthur, producing an Emperor who seemed more
like the head of a European royal family rather than a Shinto head
prieste6 and descendant of the Sun Goddess.97 And yet, the new Showa
Constitution, which codified reforms proposed by 209/1 and imple-
mented by General MacArthur, when taken in concert ith the Em-
peror's postwar status-stripped of political power--did not resolve
the conflict inherent in the combination of the Japanese Imperial
tradition with American-style constitutionalized separation of religion
and state as envisioned by the Allies."'
93 See MANNING, supra note 22, at 219-221 (quoting MacArthur's response to Washington's
desire to try Hirohito).
91 CRuMP, supra note 28, at 177.
9 SeeWard, supra note 46, at 13 (describing the Subcommittee's report).
93 See id.
See id.; see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing I:.C.das ideology mxpressed
in elementary school textbooks).
SeeWard, supra note 46, at 13; see, eg., FuJrrAN!, supra note 65, at 232 (discussing 'the em-
peror as a cultural concept (bunka gainen toshite no tenno) [and] ... a s)mbol that could not be
seen or objectified in its wholeness").
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Emperor's role as a 'chief
priest" or "shaman king").
97 SeeWard, supra note 46, at 13; see also LARGE, supra note 5. at 5 (discussing the legend of
the Emperor's divine lineage).
98 See CRUMP, supra note 28, at 156-57 (describing reform efforts and the Japanese public's
response).
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IV. THE SHOWA CONSTITUTION OF 1947
Tada yori takai mono wa nai.
-Japanese proverb
"Nothing costs so much as What is given us.""
A. Creation and Adoption
At several points during the month of October, 1945, General
MacArthur and others within the General Headquarters of the Allied
Powers (GHQ) contacted the Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and
Prime Minister, intimating that revision of the still-extant Meiji Con-
stitution was necessary, and that the Japanese Diet (Parliament) was
expected to produce a draft.'°° GHQ waited until late January, 1946
for the Japanese revision. TM
It became apparent on February 1, when the Mainichi Shinbun'°2
published a tentative draft constitution prepared by the Cabinet Con-
stitutional Revision Committee'0 3 ("Matsumoto Committee") that the
revision conceived by the Japanese parliamentarians would be unac-
ceptable to MacArthur.'"4 For example, regarding the Emperor, the
Matsumoto Committee's first draft' changed only one of the Meiji
Constitution provisions.0 6 Where Article III of the Meiji Constitution
had provided, "[t] he person of the Emperor is sacred and inviolable,"
the revision read, " [t]he person of the Emperor is supreme and invio-
lable."0 7 No changes were made at all to the sovereignty of the Em-
108
peror.
Japanese Proverbs, supra note 1, at 270-71.
0 See Tanaka Hideo, The Conflict Between Two Legal Traditions in Making the Constitution ofJa-
pan, in DEMOCRATIZINGJAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION 107, 108-09 (Robert E. Ward & Saka-
moto Yoshikazu eds., 1987) ("When Konoe Fuminaro, deputy prime minister in the Higashi-
kuni cabinet, visited General Douglas MacArthur on October 4, 1945, the latter made a
sugestion about constitutional revision.").
See id. ("GHQ continued to wait for a Japanese draft, however, until the end of January
1946.").
102 The Mainichi Shinbun is one ofJapan's largest daily newspapers.
103 Chaired by Dr.Joji Matsumoto, one of the top legal minds of his generation, the Commit-
tee was extremely distinguished and contained almost every expert on Constitutional law in Ja-
pan. See TETSUYA supra note 45, at 33; Hideo, supra note 100, at 112-14 ("The committee mem-
bers were also a very distinguished group.").
104 MacArthur's Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (SCAP) did not plan on offering its
own revision until the Matsumoto Committee Draft was leaked to the Japanese Press. See Hideo,
sujsra note 100, at 110.,05 The second draft (Draft B) contained a few additional, though slight, revisions. See id.
106 Seeid. at 111.
107 Id, see also BECKKANN, supra note 12, at 151 app. X (quoting Article III of the Meiji Consti-
tution: "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.").
108 Matsumoto hoped, somewhat myopically, that the Allied reply to the Japanese offer of
surrender was a literal offer. The offer stated that "[t]he ultimate form of government shall, in
accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the
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The Matsumoto Committee Draft was dearly inconsistent with
MacArthur's conviction that the Emperor's power should be severely
curtailed in Japan's postwar constitution. According to the official
GHQ record, MacArthur "finally came to the conclusion that the
most effective method of instructing the Japanese Government on
the nature and application of... principles he considered basic
would be to prepare a draft constitution embodying those princi-
ples."1' Upon review of the unacceptable Matsumoto committee
draft, MacArthur ordered his staff at the office the Supreme Com-
mander for the Allied Powers ("SCAP"),"" to create a constitution
that he believed would fulfill his interpretation of the requirements
of the Potsdam Declaration, particularly regarding Sections 10 and
12:
10. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to
the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies
among the Japanese People...
12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn
from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accom-
plished and there has been established in accordance with
the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully
inclined and responsible government...
MacArthur's staff was charged with the task of creating a working
constitution embodying these ideals quickly because the first postwar
general elections were only two months away. The possibility re-
mained that if a draft was not prepared and submitted in time, the
newly-elected Japanese Diet would be left to debate the merits of the
ultraconservative Matsumoto draft)' 2 MacArthur gave Major General
Courtney Whitney the task of creating the model constitution, and
Whitney and several other SCAP officials spent a week debating and
preparing their draft. When the draft was presented to the Japanese
officials and cabinet members, they were understandably shocked by
its enormous substantive variance from the Meiji Constitution.'
Nonetheless, about half of the cabinet members supported the SCAP
draft1 Finally, in an effort to break the deadlock, the Emperor was
Ja~anese people." LARGE, supra note 5, at 127.
MacArthur had assumed that the Japanese draft would have, at the very least included
reforms like: parliamentary supremacy, an executive branch answerable to the legislature, and
fundamental civil rights guarantees. SceWILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 104; Hideo, supra note 100,
at 109-110.
110SeeWiLLAMs, supra note 54, at 2.
i Hideo, supra note 100, at 108.
11See WLUms, supra note 54, at 104 ("If theJapanese continued to hedge and delay as they
had for almost four months, the people would have no choice but to vote for or against what
was nearly a carbon copy of the old Meiji Constitution.").
11See id. at 114 ("They received the model charter, he recalled, "[w]ith a distinct sense of
shock.'").
1 The more conservative cabinet members queried American officials and found them un-
illing to compromise on any of the democratic principles involved. &e id. at 115.
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consulted."5 The Emperor supported the SCAP draft, and his sup-
port settled the matter in favor of its adoption."6
When the SCAP draft was given to Matsumoto's team for transla-
tion and revision, they made several changes unwelcome to the SCAP
drafters."7 The draft was finalized on March 4, 1946 after fierce ne-
gotiations between the Matsumoto and SCAP teams." Popular press
reaction upon publication of the new draft was overwhelmingly posi-
tive.119
On the Emperor Meiji's birthday, November 3, 1947, an estimated
100,000 people gathered at the Palace Plaza to celebrate the first na-
tional Imperial Ceremony after the war. " At the ceremony, Em-
peror Hirohito reported the promulgation of the new Constitution-
a Constitution purportedly devoid of Imperial trappings and an-
chored in democratic principles-to the "national gods" in the Impe-
rial Palace's Inner Sanctuary (kyuchu sanden) . Ironically, the Showa
Emperor performed the very same ritual that his father, in enacting
the vastly different Meiji Constitution, had performed. As one apt
commentator noted, "in terms of the modem ritual idiom that had
been constructed and routinized since Meiji, it was as if little had
changed in the divide across 1945. "2
B. Textual Revolution
The present Constitution of Japan, as enacted May 3, 1947,"2 be-
gins with a preamble, followed by eleven chapters containing a total
of 103 articles. 2 4  For purposes of this Comment, the relevant por-
115 See id. ("Messrs. Shidehara and Yoshida... consulted the emperor.")
116 See id ("The emperor resolved the matter by supporting SCAP. . . ."). This is one of the
rare occasions in which the Emperor was consulted on political matters. See supra note 29 and
accompanying text (discussing the Emperor's limited role in political matters).
117 See id ("They substituted a bicameral for a unicameral legislative system and authorized
the cabinet to legislate by cabinet order in emergency situations when the Diet could not be
convoked.").
118 See id.
119 See id. at 133 ("Press reaction on 7 March to the cabinet's late afternoon announcement
the day before of its draft constitution was 'definitely and unanimously favorable.'"). But cf.
Hideo, supra note 100, at 125 (" [T]he news media and public discussion were subject to GHQ
censorship; militaristic or extremely nationalistic views were banned. Under these circum-
stances, many opportunistic and sycophantic statements were made. To say that the draft con-
stitution was well received is not to ignore this expediency. Nevertheless, it is wrong to regard
the enthusiasm for the new constitution as merely a mindless popular fad.").
12 See FUJITANI, supra note 65, at 238 ("An estimated 100,000 people gathered together on
the Palace Plaza on this day 3 November 1946 [1947], on none other than Emperor Meiji's
birthday, to participate in the festivities.").
121 See id ("The emperor then reported the Constitution's promulgation to the national
gods in the palace's Inner Sanctuary.").
122
123 SeeJAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUrTION: A FINAL REPORT 3 (John M. Maki ed. &
trans., 1980) ("[Tlhe Constitution ofJapan ... had come into effect on 3 May 1947.").
124 See generally KENPO, translated inTHE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES 3-18
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dons are all contained in Chapter I, entitled "The Emperor," Chapter
III, Article 20, separating religion and state, and Chapter VII, Article
89, forbidding public expenditures supporting religious institu-
tions.128 Chapter I outlines the Emperor's symbolic position as a
"symbol of the State," and its eight Articles are relatively detailed in
outlining the limits of the Emperor's power and responsibilities.!H Of
special note is Article 4, which prevents the Emperor from violating
any other part of the constitution.
Chapter III, Article 20 is rather clear-cut. It bars the State from
engaging in any religious activity, and provides for absolute religious
freedom.'" This Article is supplemented by Chapter VII, Article 89,
which provides: "No public money or other property shall be ex-
pended or appropriated for the use, benefit, or maintenance of any
religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational
or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public author-
ity.'
128
Interpretive difficulties in the text of the Showa Constitution were
a problem from the very beginning, first arising during the constant
interchanges between Matsumoto and SCAP drafters in refining and
translating the Constitution from its original English to Japanese. 2
Translation of the text in Chapter I has been viewed by one critic as a
series of misunderstandings and misinterpretation to the extent that
each side drew very different views from what was intended to be
identical language. Special interpretative problems revolve around
the status and role of the Emperor and the function of such phrases
as "advise and consent," "popular sovereignty," and the "people."''
An example of the type of controversy that arose was a heated de-
bate stemming from Article 3, which describes one small, but impor-
tant, aspect of the Emperor's new role under the Constitution. Article
(The Ministry ofJustice comp., 1957).
See id., see also THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN, translated and reprnted in TitE Co.NSTrnTION
OFJAPAN: ITs FIRST TWENTYYEARS, 1947-67, supra note 3, app. at 301-04. 313.
See KENP5, ch. 1, supra note 124, at 3-5.
'2 See iU., ch. 3, art. 20; see also THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN, translated and repnnted in THE
CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITs FuIR TrTE YYEARS, 1947-67, supra note 3, app. at 304
("1. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization
shall receive any privileges from the state nor exercise any political author-
ity. 2. No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious acts,
celebration, rite or practice. 3. The State and its organs shall refrain from
religious education or any other religious activity.*).
1 KENP, ch. 8, art. 89, translated in THE CONSITUTION OF JAPAN AND CRU IMXL STATUES.
sura note 124, at 18.
See INOUE, supra note 42, at 266-67 ("In the end, the negotiators created and approved two
versions of the Constitution, one in English, and the other inJapanese, which uere congenial in
their respective cultural and political traditions. But neither side realized the differences in
meaning between the two versions."); see also supra notes 114-118 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing "fierce negotiations" between the SCAP and Matsumoto teams).
ISO See INOuE, supra note 42, at 4-5.
131 SeeJAPAN'S CONMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: A FINAL REPORT 244. (John M. Maki ed. &
trans., Univ. of Washington Press 1980); INOUE, supra note 42, at 165.
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3 provides: "The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required
for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall
be responsible therefor." 2 SCAP drafters wanted to place a check on
the Emperor's power in the American constitutional tradition, by
adding "advise and consent" language, and insisted upon its accurate
translation into Japanese. 33
The Matsumoto team, coming from a tradition where the Em-
peror, though invested with absolute power by the Meiji Constitution,
had only really exercised executive power in the American presiden-
tial sense on one occasion,TM preferred to use the Meiji Constitution
translation of "advise and consent" found in Article LV.'3 Under the
Meiji translation applied by the Japanese drafters, the term "advising"
(hohitsu-shi), was defined as a type communication between the Minis-
ters of State and the Emperor, rather than a literal translation of the
words "advise" (jogen) and "consent" (shdnin).'16 The translative desire
to rely on the Meiji understanding of "advise and consent" is re-
flected in numerous Cabinet discussions which repeatedly stress that,
aside from the lone exception of the Emperor's decision to end the
war, there had always been agreement between the Emperor and the
Cabinet. The idea that changing the word hohitsu-shi implicitly
marked a change in the Emperor's relation to the Cabinet, however,
was a view considered so strange and at odds with history that most of
the Japanese debaters simply decided that when the terms jogen and
sh~nin were finally used no substantive change had really occurred. 7
In sum, the arguments which took place over the language, mean-
ing, and phraseology used in the 1947 Showa Constitution are indica-
tive of the Japanese goal of retaining the fundamental character of
the Emperor's position within the confines of an imposed constitu-
tion.TM These arguments also show explicitly how the Japanese were
willing to accept the changes imposed on them in part because the
Japanese language is flexible and vague enough to draw reasonably
divergent conclusions from identical language.
C. Dismantling of State Shinto
On December 15, 1945, SCAP issued what has come to be called
132 KENP6, art. 3, translated in THE CONsTmmON OF JAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES, supra
note 124, at 5.
133 SeeINOUE, supra note 42, at 182.
13 This occasion refers to Emperor Hirohito's role in deciding to surrender to the Allies. See
supra note 74 and accompanying text.
"The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsi-
ble for it." BECKMANN, supra note 12, at 154.
13 See INOUE, supra note 42, at 182 (discussing the role of the Emperor under the new Con-
stitution).
137 See id. at 182, 220.
133 See id at 184, 220.
139 See id. at 219-20.
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the "Shinto Directive."' 40 The Directive was issued before the prom-
ulgation of the new Constitution, 4' and it arguably laid the founda-
tion for Articles 20 and 89 of the 1947 Showa Constitution. The in-
tention of the Shinto Directive was to eliminate all state-sponsored
Shinto and, in theory, completely separate religion and state." The
over-arching goal of the Directive and its derivative constitutional
provisions was to destroy any elements of ultranationalism and milita-
rism that had been built up through the use of State Shinto.'O In car-
tying out the Shinto Directive, however, the Occupation authorities
allowed the existing Shinto shrines to become recognized as an "or-
ganized" religion, which was called "Shrine Shinto."'
Unfortunately, the Occupation authorities never anticipated or
fully addressed the issue of war-dead shrines, such as Tokyo's Yasu-
kuni Shrine, or the role the Emperor occupied as the head of the
Shinto religion.' Questions about war-dead Shinto shrines began to
emerge just after the war, but the larger question of the Emperor's
role did not emerge fully until the death of Emperor Hirohito in
1989.14 Japan has recently been forced to face these constitutional
questions by test cases in High Court and Supreme Court Grand
Bench challenges.
147
V. THE EMPEROR'S PRESENT ROLE
A. Death of Hirohito and Ascension of Akihito
Recently, one reporter queried whether the Japanese Emperor
had been transformed from "the 'living god' of a fanatical religious-
military cult" into an "ordinary human and the head of a sedate
model family?"148
The question of the Emperor's divinity remains valid, and is cru-
cial in recognizing the conflict of the Emperor's role with Article 20.
140 See CRE mRS, supra note 25, at 43 (discussing the Shinto Directive and the removal of re-
strictions on political, civil, and religious liberties).
141 SeeINouE, supra note 42, at 122-23.
1 SeeCREEiERS, supra note 25, at 44.
'4 SeeEARHART, supra note 25, at 38-39.
145 SeeCREimR, supra note 25, at 44.
1 SeeEARHART, supra note 25, at 38-39.
1 See id
147 SeeYoko Hani, Offerings 'Unconstitutional', 37JAPAN T s WE.EL L RT.AIO.CAL EDmo.N
15, April 14-20, 1997, at 1, 5 (discussing a Supreme Court decision regarding whether the use of
public funds for Shinto cash offerings violates the Constitution); Court Says Impeial Rites Might
VioWate Constitution, KYODO NEws INTERNATiOAL, INc., Japan Policy & Politics, Mar. 13, 1995,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, IAC Japan File (reporting that the Osaka High Court stated
that rites commemorating Emperor Akihito's enthronement might have violated the Constitu-
tion's rules separating religion and state).
148 Eugene Moosa, Japan's Emperor-From Living God to Modd Family Man, REuTERS NORTH
AsiffucIN Wm, Aug. 8, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter North America New
File (discussing the new role of the emperorship in Japan).
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Emperor Hirohito, the Showa Emperor, underwent a long and intri-
cate ritual process to actually accede to the Imperial throne in 1926."9
The process of accession is intended to cement the temporal powers
of the Emperor and bestow upon him the powers of the arahitogami,
the living god.'50 Accession is a three-stage process, called in Japanese
sens, sokui-rei, and daij5sai, terms which, translated roughly, mean
"accession," "ascending the throne," and "the great thanksgiving," re-
spectively.15' Daijasai, the final consummation of the accession, is the
Shinto rite of transfiguration signifying the end of the ascension pro-
cess.5 2 According to one commentator, the daij5sai has the effect of
turning the Emperor from an ordinary person into "a supernatural
being, whose person embraces the entire welfare of the people, and
has the power to represent them before all the kami [gods].'.. The
verifiability of this occurrence is of course impossible, but proof of
the Emperor's divinity was and still continues to be a highly contro-
versial matter.
4
In sharp contrast to the Emperor's participation in his accession
rituals in the late 1920's, the popular acceptance of the Emperor as
"less than divine" was a process that began with his denial of divinity
in 1946,55 and continued gradually over a long span of years. Follow-
ing MacArthur's policy directives, the Emperor visited numerous
parts of Japan and made a point to meet with everyday Japanese.'
One commentator described the postwar transformation of Hirohito:
"Instead of the militarized, dynamic, and masculinized figure riding
on his white horse, the monarch became a civilian dressed in West-
ern-style suits and soft hat who engaged in such peaceful pursuits as
marine biology, poetry, sports viewing, and, in 1975, even visiting
Disneyland."' The Emperor's "descent into mortality" is considered
to have crystallized upon the marriage of his son Crown Prince Aki-
149 Emperor Hirohito acceded to the throne on Dec. 25, 1926. See CRUMP, supra note 28, at
93; See also LARGE, supra note 5, at 1.
10 See GCRUMP, supra note 28, at 93.
151 Seeid. at95.
152 For a thorough treatment of the Daijdsai ritual, see ROBERT S. ELLWOOD, THE FEAST OF
KINGSHIP: AccEssION CEREMONIES IN ANCIENTJAPAN (1973).
153 CRUMP, supra note 28, at 107.
154 See, e.g., EARHART, supra note 25, at 39 (stating that the denial of a mythical support for
the emperor and his status as a manifest god, although a departure from pre-war indoctrination
and a surprise for the lesser educated, was an unvoiced understanding among educated peo-
ple). There is still a very vocal minority ofJapanese who decry all Allied actions in the Second
World War, including the imposition of the Showa Constitution. These "ultranationalists" are
also extremely angered by the idea that any change in the Emperor's status has ever occurred.
Over the years, there have been several incidents of violent action by some of these factions to-
wards any Japanese citizen who publicly criticized the Emperor. In the late 1960's there were
said to be over 500 ultra-right-wing-organizations with a total of 120,000 members. See PAULJ.
BAILEY, POSTWARJAPAN: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 120-21 (1996).
155 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Imperial Rescript in which
Emperor Hirohito renounced his divinity).
15 See CRUMP, supra note 28, at 156.
157 FuJITANI, supra note 65, at 238.
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hito (presently Emperor) to a commoner, Michiko Shoda, in a story-
book "tennis court romance" in 1958.'
On the other hand, several events in recent decades brought into
question the legitimacy of a non-religious Imperial role and strength-
ened the trend toward reactionary politics." For instance, in 1974,
the Emperor and Empress made a pilgrimage to Ise Shrine and re-
vived the practice of kenji doza, a ritual using two of the three imperial
symbols, the sword andjewel.'6 This ritual had been abolished after
the war.d In August, 1977, at a summer resort in Nasu, Tochigi Pre-
fecture, the Emperor made a public statement denying that he had
actually forsaken his divine character in 1946.'" These pro-Imperial
actions were exacerbated in the 1980's by Prime Minister Yasuhiro
Nakasone, who heralded in a conservative neo-nationalist govern-
ment which sponsored educational reform including mandatory flag-
hoisting ceremonies and the singing of the national anthem (Kimi ga
yo) at school ceremonies'ee These policies are still extremely conten-
tious.
164
Prime Minister Nakasone also generated controversy by his public
association with Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the home of many of Ja-
pan's war dead, including several notorious Class 1 War criminals,
such as Hideki Tojo.'6 Other State-related Shinto events which have
seemingly trampled constitutional guarantees of separation of relig-
ion and state have led to the constitutional challenges to Article 20
and Article 89 which have emerged in the last twenty-five 
years.'K-
B. Emperor Akihito and the Daij6sai
Crown Prince Akihito ascended to the throne on January 7, 1989,
upon the death of Emperor Hirohito.'6 Emperor Akihito vowed to
respect the Constitution, "together with all the citizens."'" On his
fifty-seventh birthday in 1990, he reaffirmed this desire when he said,
"I hope to perform the duties of the Emperor in a manner appropri-
See Moosa, supra note 148.
119 See EARHART, supra note 25, at 296 (discussing the impact on Japanese society of major
social changes in the 1960's and 1970's).




16 SeeBAiLEy, supra note 154, at 154-55.
IC See id- at 154 ("In 1985 the Ministry of Education caused uproar amongst teachers when it
instructed all school heads to ensure that the national flag was hoisted and the anthem sung at
school ceremonies.")
165 Hideki Tojo, Japan's wartime Prime Minister, was sentenced to death for crimes against
humanity and conspiracy to wage aggressive war. See id. at 32-33.
166 See&g., Yasukuni Shrine case, supra note 2.
167 SeeMoosa, supra note 148.
168 Id.
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ate to the present age, as a symbol of the state and the unity of the
people in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."'69 At
that time, in late 1989, the question put forth by academics and the
popular media was whether Crown Prince Akihito would undergo the
daijisai ceremony, whether it would be constitutional, and more im-
portantly, whether the Grown Prince would be, in a sense, reclaiming
the divinity which his father had renounced on New Year's Day,
1946?
0
Shortly after Emperor Hirohito's death in 1989, then Prime Min-
ister Noboru Takeshita,"' in response to a parliamentary question,
said that the daijasai ceremony had been ruled out of the Emperor's
accession by the 1947 Showa Constitution. Ultimately, however,
Crown Prince Akihito did perform the daij5sai ceremony, causing
Japanese critics to claim that the "act violated the constitutional sepa-
ration of church and state."'73 A coalition of Christians, Buddhists,
and anti-monarchists who opposed the daijdsai claimed that the
ceremony would make the Emperor a living Shinto kami [god] and
make Shinto a defacto state religion once again, a practice outlawed
by the 1947 Showa Constitution's guarantees of religious freedom.'
7
1
Article 20 of the Showa Constitution reads:
Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious or-
ganization shall receive any privileges from the State nor
exercise any political authority.
2. No person shall be compelled to take part in any relig-
ious acts, celebration, rite or practice.
3. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious edu-
cation or any other religious activity.'3'
The second part of the anti-daijdsai coalition's argument was
based on Article 89, which provides: "No public money or other
property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or
maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any
charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the con-
trol of public authority."'7 6 Critics of the daijdsai were especially in-
flamed because the Japanese government spent almost 17 million
109 Id.
170 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Imperial Rescript in which
Emperor Hirohito renounced his divinity).
Takeshita resigned in disgrace after the Recruit Cosmos Scandal. See CRUMP, supra note
28, at 213.
17 See CRUMP, supra note 28, at 213.
173 Moosa, supra note 148.
174 See Ronald E. Yates, In Japan, Some Oppose Shinto Rites, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Nov. 22, 1990, at
C35, see also KENP6, art. 20, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES,
supra note 124, at 3-18.
KENPO, art. 20, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN: ITS FIRST TWENTYYEARs, 1947-
67 supra note 3, app. at 304.
KENPO, art. 89, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OFJAPAN AND CRIMINAL STATUTES, supra
note 124, at 18.
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dollars in public funds for the event.' Even though the ceremony
could not be seen by the public except for the Emperor's entrance, it
was designated by the government as an "Imperial Family Event" and
a public ceremony. " Tensions surrounding the event were evi-
denced by thirty-four terrorist attacks which occurred during the
weeks of Akihito's enthronement.'"
Several minority religious groups brought lawsuits against the use
of taxpayer money for religious purposes, with notable results. '"'
While none of the plaintiffs recovered monetary damages, the deci-
sion handed down by the Osaka High Court was noteworthy and truly
groundbreaking, especially when viewed in the context of the Yasu-
kuni Shrine case which folowed two years later. In denying the plain-
tiffs damages of 10,000 yen per plaintiff,' presiding Judge Noriyuki
Yamanaka said, "[i]t cannot absolutely be denied that there is suspi-
don (the rites) violated the (Constitutional) rules of separation of re-
ligion and state.""" As to their Shinto context, Judge Yamanaka con-
ceded that "[ilt is obvious that (they) held the characteristics of a
Shinto ceremony."18t Regarding damages for "mental anguish," the
court, applying somewhat vague reasoning, saw that the "disburse-
ment of the public funds had been finalized," and did not feel that
the government had affected the plaintiff's thinking or had in fact
dealt them any obligation or burden.'84 The plaintiffs, pleased with
their moral victory, did not appeal the case because they felt that the
court "announced what we wanted to say." ' 8t The High Court admit-
ted that the daijdsai "may have violated the Constitution." t'
17 See Irene Kunii, Japanese Emperor's Communion Rile Stits Divinity Debate, THE REL'uS
LIBRARY REPORT, Nov. 21,1990, availabe inLEXIS, Nexis library. Reuter library Report File.
118 See Interpretations of Daisai, THE DAILYYOMIUR1, Nov. 24, 1990. at 6 ('[This appropria-
tion... was defended with the argument that because ... the enthronement ceremony... is
stipulated in the Constitution, and given that the Constitution is a public document, Dairisai is
to some degree a public ceremony."); Steven A. Weisman, Aldhilo Performs His Solitart Rite, N.Y.
ThcEs, Nov. 23, 1990, at A7 ("[S] pecatators... could only see glimmerings of the ceremony in
the dark.").
17' See Enthronement Featured Elaborate Security, THE DAILY YOMIURi, Dec. 13, 1990, at 3 (Ca-
plaining that critics believed the safety measures in place did not effectively prevent terrorist
attacks, but rather created an unnecessary distance betveen spectators and the Emperor).
16' See High Court Decision on Enthronement Rit to Be Fed KYODO NEws SERvIC, Mar. 23.
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Japan Economic News File (explaining how plaintiffs
"practically w.on the suit in gaining the High Court's admission that the government's funding
of the ritual may have violated the Constitution").
I Converted into U.S. currency, 10,000 yen is the equivalent of about 90 dollars.
1 Court says ImperialRites Might wolate Constitution, supra note 147.
184 Id-
' High Court Decision on Enthronement Rites to Be Fx" supra note 180. (explaining the Court's
reasoning that the daij~sai may have violated the Constitution's rule of separation of religion
and state).
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VI. RECENT ARTICLE 20 JURISPRUDENCE: THE YASUKUNI SHRINE
CASE
The Supreme Court Grand Bench, an arm of the Japanese Supreme
Court, is used to review the constitutionality of statutes and official acts.'
Most recently, on April 2, 1997, the Grand Bench ruled that Ehime Pre-
fecture's contributions of public funds as tamagushi-ry, or Shinto cash of-
ferings, to Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo violated Article 20 of the Constitu-
tion.'8 This landmark Yasukuni Shrine ruling overturned a 1992
Takamatsu High Court decision and reaffirmed the "significance and ef-
fect" standard.8 9 The "significance and effect" standard was initially de-
veloped in a 1977 case in which the Japanese Supreme Court ruled that a
local government's use of public funds to pay for a Shinto ceremony at the
opening of a municipal gymnasium in Tsu, Mie Prefecture was constitu-
tional.'O In the Mie Prefecture case, the Court said that it was impossible
for the State, including both local and central government, to be free of all
contacts with religion, and considered the ceremony, as "social protocol,"
to pass the "significance and effect" test.
The "significance and effect" test employed in the Yaskuni Shrine rul-
ing uses a two-part requisite formula to determine whether state-supported
activities that are questionably religious in nature are unconstitutional pur-
suant to Article 20.192 In a ruling supported by thirteen of the Court's fif-
teen Justices, the Court wrote:
(1) If the authorities' transaction's goal has a religious sig-
nificance and (2) that effect is a payment to religion, a fos-
tering, promotion, coercion, interference, or so forth, it be-
comes like a transaction that's part 1) and part 2) requisites
have been sufficient on that occasion to become unconstitu-
tional by way of Constitution Article 20, Clause 3 [Religious
Significance Clause] (if there is a case where just one of the
requisite factors is lacking, it does not become unconstitu-
187 See Suit on Separation of State and Religion Goes to Grand Bench, MAINICHI DAILY NEws, Apr. 4,
1996, at 12 ("[T]he top court usually refers cases to its grand bench ... to review the estab-
lished interpretation of laws or to determine the [ir] constitutionality.").
188 See Hani, supra note 147, at 1, 5 ("[The] Supreme Court proclaimed... offering of public
funds to shinto shrine violates the Constitution.").189 See Yasukuni Shrine case, supra note 2; see also Ruling on Shrine Donations Puts Religious Free-
dam to Test: Prefecture's Gifts Unconstitutional THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, Apr. 7, 1997, at Pol. & Soc'y 4.
1 See Hani, supra note 147, at 1, 5 (reporting that "the Shinto rite was not prohibited under
the Constitution because it could not lead to the extension of support, promotion, oppression
or interference of a religion").
191 See id. (reporting that the ceremony was considered to be "in the realm of social proto-
col.").192 See Ruling on Shrine Donations Puts Religious Freedom to Test Prefecture's Gifts Unconstitutiona4
supra note 189, at Pol. & Soc'y 4 ("Standards used by the Supreme Court in its decision were set
forth by the Grand Bench in a 1977 ruling."). Article 20 becomes meaningful in determining
the permissibility of state-supported religious activities when read in conjunction with Article
89.
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tional).1
The impermnissible "effects" are distinguishable under the formula
from "social protocol," a broad term of art that the lower court had
believed to encompass Ehime Prefecture's cash offerings to Yasukuni
Shrine.1' By deciding that the cash offerings by local government of-
ficials to Yasukuni Shrine could not pass the "significance and effect"
test, these payments were held unconstitutional by this standard.'
9
Through the Yasukuni Shrine ruling, the Court demarcated a nar-
rower interpretation of "social protocol" and paved the way for a re-
structuring of the Japanese Constitution.""
The application of the "significance and effect" test to the role of
the Emperor as defined by Chapter 1 of the Showa Constitution re-
veals the fatal flaw in the Japanese Constitution's construction. In
particular, Article 4 of the Slwwa Constitution specifies that "[t]he
Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are pro-
vided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to
government."'9 7 As the Osaka High Court case revealed, the daiftsai
component, and presumably other facets of the Emperor's accession
ceremony, violated the religious separation principles of Article 20
and in turn, implicitly violated Article 4. Presumably, the daijdsai
would easily fail Yasukuni Shrine's "significance and effect" test as well,
because enshrining the Emperor has a clear religious "sign.ificance,"
and the "effect" promotes religion in a State ceremony. If the
daijdsai and the public funding of Yasukuni Shrine are unconstitu-
tional, it follows that the entirety of the Japanese Constitution's
Chapter 1, especially Article 4, is untenable as it reads today. The
Osaka High Court and Yasukuni Shrine cases show that the fiction of a
non-religious Emperor cannot function, as explicitly stated in Article
4, consistently with the rest of the Constitution, especially Articles 20
19s See Yasukuni Shrine case, supra note 2.
As for its application, this detail, look at the American Federal case law
precedent of the Lemon test which disallows: a) Action against common
custom, b) Fostering an assistance of religious activity, c) and excessive en-
tanglement of nation and religion. In the Lemon test, if just one of the
three parts is lacking, it becomes constitutional and this difference be-
tween the Lemon test and the two-part [significance and effect] test, to be-
gin with, should be pointed out.
Id. (as translated by this author) (contrasting the instant test with the Lemon Test).
The Lemon Test provides: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; sec-
ond, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, f-
nally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'"
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (citations omitted). See also Hani. supra note
147, at3.
"4 See Lemmonr 403 U.S. at 612-13 see also Hani, supra note 147. at 1, 5.
15 See Lemmon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
' See Hani, supra note 147, at 1.
'97 KENP6, ch. 1, art. 4, translated in THE CONSTITrrION OFJAPA,': ITS FIRSr TWL.-\-n YLRS.
1947-67, supra note 3, app. at 302.
19 See supra note 195 and accompanying text (describing the "significance and effect" test).
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and 89.
In order to avoid the conclusion that the role of the Emperor to-
day does not violate Articles 4, 20, and 89 of the Showa Constitution,
one must argue that the kokutai' is defunct, and the Emperor has
truly been reduced to a non-religious, political figurehead. The de-
fects in this argument are easily identified. First, Emperor Akihito
did perform the daijosai,2°° an act which immediately calls into ques-
tion his divinity, and a fact which trumps any claim that the Emperor
is nothing more than a private non-religious figure. Second, though
the Emperor is a "symbol of the state and derives his power from
the people, he derives his religious power from his lineal descent and
role,202 as cemented by the daijasai, as chief shaman-priest of the
Shrine Shinto religion.
If Japan were to elect, for example, a religiously non-invested Em-
peror to serve as the symbol of the state, no constitutional dilemma
would exist. As it stands now, though, the Emperor is the functional
equivalent of an American religious figure elected as President, with
the federal government funding all of his or her "state" religious ac-
tivities. If America were to pursue such an unlikely course, it would
be faced with a choice between amending the U.S. Constitution to re-
flect either a change in the constitutional role of the "religious"
President or a change in the strict separation of church and state.
This is the choice that Japan faces today, and this is why the Showa
Constitution must be amended to reflect the reality of the Emperor's
position.
VII. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The present Constitution of Japan is indeed a unique historical
document. Unlike the Constitution of the United States, which was
amended numerous times during its first fifty years, the Japanese
Constitution has remained unchanged since its promulgation on May
3, 1947.202 Any public discussion about revising the Constitution had
been somewhat of a social taboo for many years.'" Nonetheless, pro-
posals to revise the Constitution have been discussed abundantly in
Japanese academia and government, to little effect. 25 The Commis-
I" See supra notes 17-22, 35-37 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of kokutai as a.paradigm ofJapanese identity," and a concept from which the Emperor derives influence).
20 See supra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (discussing Emperor Akihito's daijOsai
ceremony and the controversy it caused).
201 See generally, KENP6, ch. 1, translated in THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: ITS FIRST ",vENTY
YEARS, 1947-67, supra note 3, app. at 301-03.
"2 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing the lineage of the Emperor).203 See Japan: Revisionism Revived, THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997, at 28 ("Unlike the American
constitution, which was amended and reinterpreted extensively even during its first 50 years,
thejapanese constitution ... has remained sacrosanct").
See id.
205 JAPAN'S COMMISSION ON THE CONSTITUTION: A FINAL REPORT, supra note 123, at 3.
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sion on the Constitution, a seven-year project that began in 1957,
culminated in a report 1161 pages long, culled from 40,000 pages of
minutes from meetings, committee reports, hearings and other dis-
cussions of any and all problems relating to the Japanese Constitu-
tion.2°6 No definitive conclusions were reached. " 7 In the early 1990's,
with the eruption of the Gulf War, talk revived in Japan of revising
the Constitution, with most of the discussion revolving around the
role of Article 9, the anti-war provision.!" In one survey of Diet
members, sixty percent came out in favor of constitutional amend-
ments.2 9 Aside from revising Article 9, many wanted amendments
addressing environmental or privacy concerns.3 ' Few Diet member
have, however, publicly called for revision of the articles regarding
the role of the Emperor.
On November 3, 1994, the Daily Yomiuri, Japan's largest daily
newspaper, broke the forty-seven-year-old social taboo against calling
for change of the Constitution by publishing a revised draft constitu-
tion which called for very specific changes in several areas of the Con-
212stitution. This populist revisionist draft called for four main points
of Imperial reform:
(1) Stipulating in separate chapters national sovereignty and the
status of the Emperor as the symbol of the state, which are both
stipulated currently in Article 1 of the Constitution;
(2) Transferring the article on 'limits to the Emperor's func-
tions" to just before the article on "advice and approval of the
Cabinet on the Emperor's acts in matters of state;"
(3) Making the roles of the Emperor more ceremonial in matters
of state that can be regarded as matters of state policy, such as
dissolution of the House of Representatives and convening of the
See id. at 4.
See i&
SeeJapan: Reidonism Revive, supra note 203, at 28.
The Gulf War of 1991, however, marked a watershed. The Japanese were
left as bystanders while American and allied soldiers shed blood, partly on
oil-dependent Japan's behalf: The talk ever since has revolved around
amending the constitution, so Japan can become an "ordinary nation",
able to do its share of the dirty work around the world. The debate has
taken on added urgency since Bill Clinton's visit to Tokyo last year [1996],
when it was agreed thatJapan would play a more active role in the long-




1 See id. ("lA]ny open discussion of actually revising the constitution was until recently ta-
boo for politicians."). Curiously, it has been argued thatJapan has no official head of state or
official national flag. The Emperor is not the official head of state because the government
considers it too "provocative" to declare him as the official head of state, and thereby perhaps
violate the1947 Constitution. Likewise, the flag, a symbol of wartime aggression, is not officially
adopted, though it is in relatively common use. Se Nicholas D. Kristof, Japan's State Syr:&s-
Now You See Them.. ., N.Y. TniEs, Nov. 12, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 3.
212 See The Emperor: Clarifing the Status of the Emperor, THE DAILaYOMIURI, Nov. 3. 1994, at 16.
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Diet; and
(4) Giving the Emperor nominal functions as head of state in re-
lation to external relations.
215
Though the Yomiuri draft adequately addresses some pressing issues,
particularly the Emperor's status as head of state, it is woefully inade-
quate when read in the context of the verdicts of the Osaka High
Court and the Yasukuni Shrine cases. While the Yomiuri draft engages
some practical political issues, seemingly clarifies the relationship be-
tween the Emperor and the people, and solves some of the clumsy
Japanese used in the Showa Constitution, it fails to address the real
problems inherent in the Emperor's role and the conflict between
that role and Articles 20 and 89.
It appears that the best solution for Japan's constitutional di-
lemma is a revised Constitution with "a clearly defined position for
Shrine Shinto and its ceremonies, especially those ceremonies which
connect Shrine Shinto with the Imperial House."21 4 In 1962, Japanese
scholar Satomi Kishio unsuccessfully proposed a possible solution to
this constitutional conundrum .2 5 His visionary proposal now appears
partially vindicated by the holdings of the Osaka High Court and Ya-
sukuni Shrine cases. Satomi's version of Article 20 reads as follows:
The state affirms the importance of religion in the spiri-
tual lives of the people; it equally protects all religious sects
that have a proper religious value. The Emperor and the
state transcend all religious sects; they do not belong to any
religious sect or religious organization, and they do not give
special protection to any specified religious sect or religious
organization.
The state may not interfere with any of the religious
sects, religious organizations, or their believers, as long as
their faith, teachings, rituals and meetings, or their internal
system are not against the constitution. The state can con-
trol, as determined by law, superstition, evil worship, and
false religions. 216
To fully tackle the daijcsai and Yasukuni Shrine problems, Satomi's
draft constitution adds constitutional regulation which neatly com-
partmentalizes these religious manifestations as a special type of ac-
213 Id.
214 CREEMERS, supra note 25, at 96.
25 See id. (quoting SATOMI KISHIO, NIHONKOKU No KENP6 [THE CONSTrrtroN OF JAPAN]
430 (1962)).
216 Satomi's draft is highly problematic in many respects, particularly when he speaks of State
control of "superstition, evil worship, and false religions." Conceivably, under Satomi's model,
constitutional or statutory authority could dictate what religions might be considered "false" or
.evil." This is clearlyfar too totalitarian a regime, and contradicts the democratic principle em-
bodied in freedom of religion. Aside from this dangerous structure, Satomi's draft is quite
practical and revolutionary.
[Vol. 1: 2
Fall 1998] CONSTJTUTONAL CONFLICT IST=H T-EJAPANSE IMPERLAL ROLE 413
ceptable "state rites":
21 7
-The grand coronation ceremony and the ceremonies
transmitted in the Imperial House, are ancient rites of the
state; they are different from the activities of religious sccts.
-The Ise grand shrine and other shrines designated by law
are establishments where the ancient rites of the state are
performed. The grand shrine and the shrines of the previ-
ous paragraph are subject to the free respect and worship of
the people. Their sole task is the promotion of the unity of
the popular spirit. They are not to propagate or enforce a
specific religious teaching or faith, or criticize or reject the
articles of faith, the teachings, and the rituals of other relig-
ions. The functions based on the characteristic traditions of
each shrine are recognized so far as they preserve the time-
honored customs of the people. Particulars are determined
by the Grand Shrine and Shrine Laws. 218
Applying the formula of the Japanese Supreme Court Grand
Bench in the Yasukuni Shrine case to Satomi's model, contributions to
Yasukuni Shrine, endowed by "free respect and worship of the peo-
ple," would be considered dejure "social protocol" rather than the fos-
tering of religion. Though Satomi's model assumes the same legal
fiction the Supreme Court ruled against in the Yasukuni Shrine case, it
would solve the realpolitik of the daijdsa4 and allow for donations to
the particular Imperially-related shrines. In essence, Satomi's model
codifies the Imperial throne as constitutionally acceptable "social
protocol." A critic of Satomi's proposal could justifiably say that it
strengthens the Emperor's symbolic role too much, explicitly revives
kokutai and State Shinto, and remythologizes the Imperial role, all of
which led Japan down the dark path of the Second World War. In
this sense, Satomi's proposal could be considered dangerous in the
same manner that the Occupation Authorities considered these ele-
ments dangerous when it ordered the Shinto Directive.2 9 Japan must
at the same time, however, constitutionally recognize the fact that the
Emperor is, historically and traditionally, a religiously-vested figure
whose behavior and public support should not repeatedly violate the
Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The Emperor's role is a unique example of the conflict inherent
in coexisting religions and democratic principles. Constitutional re-
form is necessary to reconcile the Emperor's role with Articles 20 and
89 so that the integrity of Article 4's separation of religion and state is
217 1d
218 see Id.
219 See supra notes 140-44 and accompan)ing text (discussing the Shinto Directive).
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not compromised.
The necessity of this change will surely be challenged by support-
ers of the status quo. After all, Imperial roles, though evident in the
national anthem Kimi ga yo, and symbolized by the Japanese flag, only
force themselves upon the Japanese public when extraordinary Impe-
rial events occur, such as upon the death of an emperor, or when an
emperor comments on sensitive issues of foreign policy. Perhaps the
Japanese consciousness has internalized its Emperor and routinized
its constitutional jurisprudence beyond change. This might explain
why an angered Yukio Mishima 220 stated that, "without the Emperor
the Japanese people have no identification."221 Only Constitutional
Amendment can rectify the inherent flaws in order to keep apace
with the dynamic and complex reality that is the Imperial role at the
dawn of the twenty-first century.
N Mishima, a popular novelist, shocked Japan on November 26, 1970 by committing ritual
suicide at the headquarters of the Self-Defense Forces in Tokyo as a protest against the "deca-
dent" Allied-imposed Constitution and what he viewed as the delegitimization of the military.
See LARGE, supra note 5, at 170; FUJrrANI, supra note 65, at 232 (describing Mishima's view of the
EmJgeror).
See LARGE, supra note 5, at 171.
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